Thoughts on police-chase case Scott v. Harris. Watch the police videos here.

The crucial question is whether the Deputy Scott’s act (running Harris off the road) was a reasonable seizure under the 4th Amendment, or whether it was unreasonable and therefore violated Harris’s 4th Amendment rights. The case is a short education on “summary judgment” – which the Supreme Court majority renders in favor of Scott by reversing the judgment of a three judge panel of the 11th Circuit and the original District Court Judge, all of whom denied summary judgment.

The reasonableness of an act is a question of fact for the jury – until a judge takes the determination out of the jury’s hands by deeming that “no reasonable jury” could find the act reasonable/unreasonable. When a judge makes that determination, he is deeming the act reasonable/unreasonable as a matter of law.

This is the only way to win by summary judgment – the evidence viewed in the light (with the inferences) most favorable to the nonmoving party must be such that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Thus, there being no genuine issue (relevant disputed fact) for trial, summary judgment is appropriate.

Justice Scalia concludes his summary judgment discussion, writing:

When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record [the video], so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Slip Opinion, Opinion of the Court @ 7.

But whether a party’s “story” is “blatantly contradicted by the record” is a determination of fact – Scalia’s own determination of fact. Disagreeing with Scalia’s decisive personal feelings about the facts are the District Court Judge, the Eleventh Circuit’s three judge panel, and Justice Stevens. Based on their differing view, these judges conclude that summary judgment is inappropriate and the jury should decide the case.

Justice Stevens, in his solo dissent, skewers Scalia and the majority perfectly, writing:

If two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s characterization of events. Slip Opinion, Dissent @ 8.

The majority Justices seem too comfortable with their own fact-finding prowess, branding fellow sitting judges and potential jurors unreasonable for their actual and potential disagreement. You are unreasonable, I am not.

Isn’t this is exactly the sort of disagreement of perception that should make denial of summary judgment automatic: eminently reasonable people steeped in the law have already disagreed in interpreting the facts?

What’s your opinion?

B