Those five … are Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas (who did not speak during the proceedings), Anthony Kennedy, Roberts and Scalia. That leaves a 5-4 vote, with Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens largely in support of current campaign finance laws. Kennedy dissented in Austin and could turn that dissent into the majority view now… . Kennedy left little question about his view on the matter during today’s oral arguments.

When the Supreme Court asked to re-hear oral arguments in this case, the justices specifically posed the question whether they should overturn one previous campaign finance case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), and the parts of another, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003), that uphold the regulation of corporate spending in elections.

In Austin, the Court found that electioneering communications rules were in the government’s interest to prevent “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form.”

The Hill reports on the McCain-Feingold press conference outside the Supreme Court following the reargument:

After the arguments, McCain and Feingold both blasted justices for being dangerously out of touch.

“The questioning shows a real disconnect, a strong disconnect between the justices and political reality,” McCain said at the press conference.

“I wish that one of the justices who were standing up for people’s First Amendment rights had ever run for county sheriff,” he added. The justices showed an “extreme naïveté of the influence of corporate money and soft money.”

The Supreme Court upheld the McCain-Feingold law several times while former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor served on the court. O’Connor was the Senate majority leader in the Arizona state Senate; the court now has no member who has held elected office.

O’Connor’s departure and the arrival of Alito has shifted the balance of the court against McCain-Feingold, according to people on both sides of the debate.

Feingold warned that, should the court roll back sections of McCain-Feingold by overturning Austin and McConnell, it would leave Congress with “no ability” to reform the campaign finance system.

For me, this is very troubling. The Court may find a way to rule narrowly in this case, without drastically altering the law. But if not, my next post on this topic will be titled Notes from the Corpocracy. The Court’s opinion should appear later this year.

B

I watched an excellent debate on these issues on Bill Moyers’ Journal the other night. The transcript is here, or you can watch it. Trevor Potter, an attorney who has filed a friend-of-the-court brief defending the McCain-Feingold legislation observed that oil giant Exxon Mobil, through its political action committee (which accumulates funds through voluntary contributions of shareholders, employees and management) spent about 900 thousand dollars in the last election cycle under the restrictions imposed by current laws. But the company made 85 billion dollars net profit last year. If even a fraction of that money could be tapped for political campaigns, the megaphone given to such entities would be huge beyond compare.

What if a candidate was going to take positions Exxon Mobil didn’t like, perhaps strongly advocating alternative energy over oil, emphasizing measures against global warming, or increased taxation on oil companies? Exxon could threaten to drown such a candidate in a deluge of attack ads and unlimited funding for their opponent. Candidates not willing to toe the corporate line could be deterred from running.

Potter argues that by law, vast economic power has been given to corporations – power not available to individuals – but it was never intended for corporations to engage in unregulated, unlimited political speech. A corporation’s sole purpose is to maximize profit. It cannot vote, it is not among the constituents represented by elected officials. The First Amendment protects the free speech of PEOPLE, not of these creatures of statute we call corporations.

Noted First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams responded with a broad defense of free speech:

And why are we limiting free speech? If the movie had been funded in a different way, if the funds had come from different sources … then it would be protected. But because the funding came from a corporation. Because of that, we can make it a crime to put the movie out. That I think is an unacceptable articulation of not only what the First Amendment has meant. But what it ought to mean, as well. We should not make technical distinctions about the degree of First Amendment free speech rights, depending on the nature of the entity that engages in the speech.

If a company wants to speak out beyond an issue. If they want to condemn a Senator who is opposing legislation that has an impact on the company’s interest, economic or otherwise to me it’s just anathema to the notion of free speech to say, “Well, you have to understand it’s a company. Their funding is different.” That’s not the way we ought to go about deciding the limits of free speech.

Check the transcript for the entirety of the discussion. I’ll try to link a report on the oral arguments taking place today. I agree with Potter’s argument that corporations aren’t people, and their “speech” should be regulated. They have a huge advantage over individuals in amassing funds – we have given them those preferences in a careful balancing of our societal interests, of which economic prosperity is one part. To suddenly allow corporations to also dominate the political money scene - when their interest is not societal betterment but solely profit maximization – would have a negative long term impact on the people of our nation. 

B

LATimes.com reports the Supreme Court will hear an appeal by Major League Baseball from a loss to a ”fantasy” baseball league. The for-profit fantasy league says it is just disseminating publicly available statistics (in line with First Amendment Free Speech), but MLB says that when linked to the names of players — who have a right to control their own publicity — the statistics are proprietary. The Circuit Courts are split on the issue.

[I]t could disrupt “billions of dollars” of licensing deals in pro-sports, lawyers for Major League Baseball said in their appeal to the Supreme Court. “Celebrities and athletes have enforceable publicity rights,” they argued, and the 1st Amendment has never been understood to give other companies a right “to exploit players’ identities for commercial gain.”

A lawyer for the St. Louis-based fantasy league countered that baseball and its daily box scores were available to the public. “The mere dissemination of facts or statistics is protected. And all our clients are doing is disseminating the same information that newspapers put in the sports pages every day,” said Rudolph Telscher, a lawyer who won the ruling in St. Louis.

Not so, replies Major Baseball League. The dispute involves famous names, not mere statistics, the league argues. Though the names of players such as Albert Pujols or Derek Jeter may be published or broadcast every day, “those names may not be incorporated without the famous persons’ consent primarily for commercial purposes into a product — be it a coffee mug, a poster, a board game or an Internet game — without consent,” the league said.

Washingtonpost.com reports that “Footprints in the Sand,” a famous “anonymous” religious poem, now has multiple competing claims of authorship resulting in a federal lawsuit for copyright infringement. Millions have been made printing the poem on various paraphernalia, and the newest claimant wants a piece.

At least a dozen people have insisted that the lines of “Footprints in the Sand” came to them alone, usually by divine spark, differing only by a few words here and there. The stanzas all tell a similar story: Narrator dreams he is walking on a beach with the Lord (sometimes God, sometimes Jesus). After a while, narrator turns around and sees only one set of footprints. What gives? the narrator asks the Lord — You promised You would walk with me, even in the bad times, but I see from my lone set of footprints that You weren’t there! Ah, but, the Lord replies : The single set of footprints are when I carried you through the bad times. (Cue the gulls, the gentle sound of waves and the warmth of insight.)

The only problem is one of nagging details: proof of authorship, original publication, copyright, notarization, that sort of thing. “Footprints” has been adapted into different languages, and worse, a pop song co-produced by Simon Cowell. As a sure sign of its familiarity, it has also been wickedly parodied. (”Bull-[bleep], Jesus, Those Are Obviously My Footprints,” joked an Onion headline 10 years ago.)

Finally, nysun.com has a story on Justice Scalia’s speech to a Jewish group on his views of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

The justice didn’t make any radical departures from positions he has taken on the high bench, echoing language in his dissent in a 2005 case involving the displays of the Ten Commandments that two counties in Kentucky had installed in their courthouses. But his remarks appeared intended to inspirit and encourage the largest grass roots organization of fervently religious Jews in America, an organization that is engaged in the constitutional debate in the country on such issues as gay marriage, parochial schools, and civil rights for religious individuals.

Justice Scalia began speech last night, as he did his dissent in the Kentucky case, McCreary County v ACLU, by recalling President Bush’s valediction in a speech delivered shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: “God bless America.” Such a statement, Justice Scalia said, would be “absolutely forbidden” in many countries in Europe. Justice Scalia was in Rome at the time of the attacks, attending a conference of judges and lawyers.

Speaking last night, Justice Scalia cautioned the audience against being “so quick to believe” that the Jeffersonian principle of separation between church and state is represented by the “type of separation found in Europe.” Justice Scalia noted approvingly that in America the Supreme Court has upheld tax exemptions for houses of worship as well as the constitutionality of allowing ministers to open legislative hearings with a prayer.

I thought “the power to tax is the power to destroy” and it follows that tax exemptions for churches are allowed, indeed demanded, by the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment (rather than by a “traditionally proper bending” of the Establishment Clause as Scalia implies), but I’m not a supreme court justice. Yet.

B

I looked at Morse v. Frederick (“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” – First Amendment: school speech) trying to make sense of the fractured spate of opinions…

In Morse, students were allowed out of Juneau, Alaska high school to view a leg of the Olympic Torch Relay passing through town in 2002, purportedly as a school field trip. On the sidewalk opposite school property, some students unrolled a large banner containing the message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” Principle Morse intervened, demanding the banner be taken down. One student, plaintiff Frederick, refused. Morse tore down the banner and Frederick was subsequently suspended for 8 days.

The Ninth Circuit reversed Frederick’s failure at the District Court level, finding a First Amendment violation (because the school had not shown the “threat of a substantial disruption”), and disallowing a claim of qualified immunity by the principal on the grounds that a reasonable principal should have known tearing down the sign was a First Amendment violation.The Supreme Court granted cert for Morse’s appeal. The Justices split five ways, with the controlling opinion dictated by two Justices (a fact ignored, glossed over or missed entirely by many commentators).

Here is the breakdown:

Roberts authored the purported Opinion of the Court, “fully” joined by Scalia. The thrust of the opinion is the carving out of a new category of proscribable speech in a school setting: speech advocating drug use. Hinted at (and subsequently rejected by Alito and Kennedy’s limitation) is that any message contrary to the school’s educational mission can be prohibited. Roberts justifies the departure from the standards of Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) by relying on another school speech case, Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), which implies the Tinker principles are not absolute. 

Thomas joined the Opinion of the Court, but wrote separately to advocate a strict, old-fashioned in loco parentis view of school authority over students, and claiming that the modern First Amendment principles set out in Tinker v. Des Moines (Vietnam armband case) had no basis in the Constitution. He lists old, pre-Tinker cases that, while supporting his argument, are beyond the pale by modern standards. Most damning is Wooster v. Sunderland (1915):

[T]he California Court of Appeal upheld the expulsion of a student who gave a speech before the student body that criticized the administration for having an unsafe building “because of the possibility of fire.” Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51, 52, 148 P. 959, (1915). The punishment was appropriate, the court stated, because the speech “was intended to discredit and humiliate the board in the eyes of the students, and tended to impair the discipline of the school.”

By today’s standards, the expelled student would clearly be vindicated in his First Amendment complaint, and rightly so by any understanding of free speech and its impact on good public policy.

Alito authored a separate opinion joined by Kennedy, which is actually the controlling opinion in the case. Therein, Alito and Kennedy condition their joining of the Opinion of the Court on the limiting of that decision:

[We] join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on issues such as “the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.” [rejecting any broader "educational mission" justification]

Alito also pauses to beat up Thomas’s in loco parentis argument:

When public school authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents of the State; they do not stand in the shoes of the students’ parents. It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority — including their authority to determine what their children may say and hear — to public school authorities. It is even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of authority somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the State.

Breyer writes separately and technically numbers among the dissenters. In Breyer’s opinion the Court should rule that the principal (Morse) had qualified immunity and no money damages to Frederick were justified.  Breyer would not reach the merits of the free speech issue, and from parsing his opinion, it is reasonably clear he would reject the logic of Alito’s controlling opinion:

[W]hile the holding is theoretically limited to speech promoting the use of illegal drugs, it could in fact authorize further viewpoint-based restrictions. … [I]t is unclear how far the Court’s rule regarding drug advocacy extends. What about a conversation during the lunch period where one student suggests that glaucoma sufferers should smoke marijuana to relieve the pain? What about deprecating commentary about an antidrug film shown in school? And what about drug messages mixed with other, more expressly political, content? If, for example, Frederick’s banner had read “LEGALIZE BONG HiTS,” he might be thought to receive protection from the majority’s rule, which goes to speech “encouraging illegal drug use.” Ante, at 2 (emphasis added). But speech advocating change in drug laws might also be perceived of as promoting the disregard of existing drug laws. [emphasis mine]

I have to agree with Breyer that the qualified immunity angle seems reasonable, as does putting off a decision on the merits in such a weird [the Court's word, not mine] scenario. For a principal seeing the subject banner, I cannot myself fathom how he or she could reach the conclusion that removing said banner – drug themed in a school setting – would be unconstitutional. There is some technical glitch with the immunity argument. Breyer states his case for wiggling around it, and Alito isn’t satisfied with Breyer’s argument – but if you’re really interested in this coma-inducing tidbit you’ll have to read the opinion.

Finally, Stevens authors the compelling dissent, joined by fellow liberals Souter and Ginsburg. Stevens main point is that “punishing someone for advocating illegal conduct [if the banner does such, which he disputes] is constitutional only when the advocacy is likely to provoke the harm that the government seeks to avoid.” Mere advocacy has never been equated with incitement to imminent lawless action.

“[P]romoting illegal drug use,” … comes nowhere close to proscribable “incitement to imminent lawless action.” Brandenburg, 395 U. S., at 447. Encouraging drug use might well increase the likelihood that a listener will try an illegal drug, but that hardly justifies censorship:

“Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. . . Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however rep-rehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted upon.” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

No one seriously maintains that drug advocacy (much less Frederick’s ridiculous sign) comes within the vanishingly small category of speech that can be prohibited because of its feared consequences. Such advocacy, to borrow from Justice Holmes, “ha[s] no chance of starting a present conflagration.” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 673 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
…

[J]ust as we insisted in Tinker that the school establish some likely connection between the armbands and their feared consequences, so too JDHS must show that Frederick’s supposed advocacy stands a meaningful chance of making otherwise-abstemious students try marijuana.

But instead of demanding that the school make such a showing, the Court punts. Figuring out just how it punts is tricky…. On occasion, the Court suggests it is deferring to the principal’s “reasonable” judgment that Frederick’s sign qualified as drug advocacy. At other times, the Court seems to say that it thinks the banner’s message constitutes express advocacy. Either way, its approach is indefensible.

To the extent the Court defers to the principal’s ostensibly reasonable judgment, it abdicates its constitutional responsibility. The beliefs of third parties, reasonable or otherwise, have never dictated which messages amount to proscribable advocacy. Indeed, it would be a strange constitutional doctrine that would allow the prohibition of only the narrowest category of speech advocating unlawful conduct, see Brandenburg, 395 U. S., at 447–448, yet would permit a listener’s perceptions to determine which speech deserved constitutional protection.

Such a peculiar doctrine is alien to our case law.

Two other important First Amendment cases came down on Monday:

Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (Political speech, campaign finance reform – loosening restrictions on issue-based “attack” ads) 

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (executive branch expenditures on faith-based organizations, no standing for taxpayers to sue.)

Along with these two:

National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife (trumping the Endangered Species Act.)

Wilkie v. Robbins (federal harassment – no viable federal causes of action)

I might discuss Wilkie later, since every commentator has ignored it and it has fun facts.

A discussion of the end-of-term cases I’ve enjoyed reading between Dahlia Lithwick and Walter Dellinger can be found on Slate, here.

More on Thursday’s cases soon.

B

The state alleged that the comments would amount to harassment, identity theft, and identity deception if posted by an adult. The Putnam Circuit Court judge held the comments were obscene, found A.B. to be delinquent, and sentenced her to 9 months of probation. On appeal, A.B. argued the comments were protected political speech since they dealt with school policy. The Indiana Court of Appeals overturned the lower court ruling, finding it to be protected free speech under the First Amendment.

How far do you think this will go? Will students now be allowed to respond with profanities when teachers try to enforce other policies, such as not talking in class, arriving on time, and other policies?